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Abstract
The writers propose a mathematical Method for deriving risk weights which describe
how a borrower’s income, relative to their debt service obligations (serviceability) affects
the probability of default of the loan.
The Method considers the borrower’s income not simply as a known quantity at the
time the loan is made, but as an uncertain quantity following a statistical distribution
at some later point in the life of the loan. This allows a probability to be associated
with an income level leading to default, so that the relative risk associated with different
serviceability levels can be quantified. In a sense, the Method can be thought of as
an extension of the Merton Model to quantities that fail to satisfy Merton’s ‘critical’
assumptions relating to the efficient markets hypothesis.
A set of numerical examples of risk weights derived using the Method suggest that
serviceability may be under-represented as a risk factor in many mortgage credit risk
models.
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1 Introduction
Traditional mortgage credit risk models take a functional approach to producing a credit
risk metric, generating an absolute final risk metric from the starting point of absolute
base probability of default and loss given default. The authors have instead developed a
differential credit risk model which is based on how the risk metric relates to changing
loan characteristics, leaving the decision about absolute risk levels to the user.
The authors propose a mathematical Method for deriving risk weights which describe
how a borrower’s income, relative to debt service obligations (serviceability) affects the
probability of default of a loan. The Method considers the borrower’s income not simply
as a known (assessed) quantity at the time the loan is made, but as an uncertain quantity
following a statistical distribution at some later point in the life of the loan. This
follows a similar path to the Merton model [1], often used in the analysis of corporate
credit risk. Treating income as a distribution allows a probability to be associated with
an income level leading to default, so that the relative risk associated with different
serviceability levels can be quantified. We provide numerical examples of serviceability
risk weights, and suggest that current industry approaches may significantly under-
represent the importance of serviceability to mortgage credit risk.
The Method can be extended so that other risk characteristics of the borrower can
be treated as modifications to the income distribution chosen, rather than treated as
discrete modules within the credit risk model.
The Method was developed in the context of residential mortgages, but has ap-
plicability to any form of lending supported by an income stream which is subject to
uncertainty.
Although not addressed in detail in this paper, the Method can also be applied
to other loan characteristics where a variability over time can lead to default (such as
loan-to-value ratio in a limited recourse environment) to expand the applications for
differential credit risk models.
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2 Background
2.1 Credit Risk Models
The traditional structure of most mortgage credit risk models can be thought of as a
process whereby a metric of credit risk is derived for a specified borrower via the following
steps:
1. A base probability of default (“Base PD”) and base loss given default (“Base
LGD”) are defined, corresponding to some generic borrower, and the credit risk
appetite and view of the lender;
2. The Base PD and Base LGD are adjusted to reflect various characteristics of the
specified loan, such as borrower or collateral quality (this resulting in “Adjusted
PD” and “Adjusted LGD”). Adjustments are typically applied as successive mul-
tiplicative factors (“Risk Weights”), each corresponding to a particular risk char-
acteristic of the borrower1;
3. The product of Adjusted PD and Adjusted LGD give an expected loss (“EL”)2;
4. EL can be used to drive the lending decision, pricing and capital requirement.
Structured finance RMBS criteria of the major credit rating agencies are good public
examples of this approach.
It is important to note in relation to point 2, that each Risk Weight is typically de-
termined by a single discrete risk characteristic (or small closely related subset of charac-
teristics). This ‘Modularity Assumption’ greatly simplifies the mathematical structure
of a credit risk model, and is generally found to still lead to sensible results.
Within this traditional framework, many variations exist, however the basic structure
is close to universal.
2.2 The Merton Model
The analysis of corporate credit risk is often framed in terms of the Merton Model [1],
where the value of a security issued by a firm is given in terms of the value of the
firm, with that value assumed to be subject to continuous volatility. The essence of the
Merton Model is that default is taken to correspond to a deficiency of assets.
1Typically, the Base PD will be further adjusted to fall within certain maximum and minimum levels,
however this process is not relevant to this paper
2Some models start with a Base EL in step 1, adjusted as per step 2 and omit this step 3. This is
clearly mathematically equivalent to the approach described.
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The characteristics of mortgages do not naturally lend themselves to a Merton-style
analysis, since:
1. The underlying asset (the security property) is not a fungible asset traded in an
open market with continuous price discovery; and
2. Mortgages rely primarily on the income of the borrower and only secondarily on
the security property value.
This paper focuses on the second issue, the relationship between the income of the
borrower and probability of default.
Sy [2] applied the Merton Model to borrower income to derive probabilities of default,
as part of a programme of developing a credit model integrating probability of default and
loss given default, however the authors are not aware of any subsequent developments
along these lines in the literature.
2.3 Absolute vs Differental Risk Models
2.3.1 Absolute Risk Models
A hallmark of most mortgage credit risk models is that they are based on absolute
measures of risk. Base PD, Base LGD and each of the Risk Weights are given as fixed
numerical parameters, and EL is simply a function of these. While the parameters may
be adjusted from time to time, at any time they each have a single value deemed ‘correct’
under the model3. It follows that for each unique borrower defined by a particular set of
risk characteristics, there is a single EL value, again deemed ‘correct’ under the model.
We suggest that this absolute approach to risk suffers a number of shortcomings:
• Much more attention is paid to the end points (Base PD, Base LGD and EL) than
to the way that risk changes as a result of risk characteristics (Risk Weights and
the underlying algorithm);
• There is a tendency to validate the model by simply testing EL against historical
loss experience rather than to develop a coherent rationale for each Risk Weight;
and
• Each model binds its user to a very specific risk view.
3In the case of Credit Rating Agencies, the different rating bands can be thought of as multiple
models, from which users may select the one reflecting their risk appetite
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2.3.2 A Differential Risk Model
The writers have developed a proprietary credit risk model, initially for application to
residential mortgages, the Risk Quantification Methodology (“RQM”). The RQM is not
an absolute model, but a differential model. RQM does not specify any absolute base
risk metric, only how the risk metric changes as loan characteristics change. Individual
users may specify their own base levels (and other parameters) to generate a model
reflecting their own risk view.
In the course of developing RQM for mortgages, we have developed a general mathe-
matical approach to deriving Risk Weights to reflect the borrower’s income level relative
to their debt service obligations (serviceability).
3 Serviceability
3.1 Defining Serviceability
We define serviceability as the ability of the borrower to meet their debt service obliga-
tions out of their net cash income4.
For the purposes of demonstrating our Method, we consider one common measure
of serviceability in mortgage lending, the Net Servicing Ratio (“NSR”), defined as:
N = IN/RN (1)
where
N is the NSR,
IN is the borrower’s assessed periodic net income at the time of application,
incorporating whatever stresses are mandated by the lender, and
RN is the borrower’s minimum required repayment at the time of application,
incorporating whatever stresses are mandated by the lender.
Different lenders approach NSR differently, however typically lenders will apply var-
ious stresses to ensure that borrowers have some ‘cushion’ against changing circum-
stances, such as interest rate rises or income reduction. Typical stresses include:
• Only crediting a proportion of the borrowers actual net income to IN . We will
refer to the actual (unstressed) assessed income as I0;
4This is a deliberately general definition, reflecting the wide range of types of lending and borrower.
Our Method can be applied to whatever specific measure of serviceability applies to the particular type
of lending and/or borrower
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• Applying an interest rate stress to calculate the minimum required repayment,
RN ;
• Requiring all borrowers to meet a particular NSR threshold (eg, 1.1).
3.2 Defining Repayment Coverage and Default
While NSR measures serviceability at the point of loan application and approval, we also
need an ongoing measure of serviceability from time to time. We define the Repayment
Coverage Ratio (“RCR”) as:
C = I/R (2)
where
C is the RCR at a given time,
I is the borrower’s actual periodic net income at that time, and
R is the borrower’s actual required repayment at that time.
Now we can assume that the loan will default if the RCR is less than 1, meaning
that the borrower’s net income is insufficient to meet their repayment obligation.
3.3 Changes in Net Income and Repayment Coverage Ratio
While a borrower’s actual periodic net income I may be reasonably accurately assessed
at the time of application, it can change over the life of the loan (either increasing or
decreasing), for a variety of reasons. Focussing on individual borrowers these could
include:
• Pay rises or reductions, say through promotion, demotion or career change
• Family income reduction with maternity or paternity leave;
• Increased or decreased expenditure through lifestyle change, say from child-raising
or ‘sea-change’;
• Unforeseen life events such as illness, divorce or business success.
3.4 Income as a Distribution
We are interested in default behaviour over the life of the loan, so we need to consider
the borrower’s net income over the life of the loan. We achieve this by considering the
borrower’s ‘true’ income over time not as a fixed quantity, but as variable quantity,
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‘migrating’ from its initial value. This leads us to consider it as a distribution around
I0, the initial, unstressed, assessed income.
We need to clarify the timeframe over which we are considering the income migration.
This may appear to be the legal tenor of the loan, however this will not always be the case.
For example, residential mortgages typically have tenors of around 30 years. However
default behaviour is heavily concentrated in the first few years. The Method restricts
the relevant timeframe, the Default Horizon, which depends on the particular features
of the loan and may be less than its legal tenor.
To summarise, under the Method, a borrower’s income distribution reflects the like-
lihood of the borrower’s income migrating to another value within the Default Horizon.
For the purposes of demonstrating the Method below, we make the assumption that
true income over time is distributed normally around the assessed income, but note
that the Method can be used with other choices of distribution, including non-central
distributions (though with some loss of mathematical simplicity).
3.4.1 Comparison to Merton and Sy
We note that our approach differs from Sy [2] and Merton [1] in that we do not model
the income distribution as the result of a continuous diffusion process, but instead treat
it simply as a defined distribution within the default horizon. This is equivalent to
discarding Merton’s assumptions that:
1. The underlying quantity is a continuously traded asset; and
2. The price of the underlying quantity can be described by a particular diffusion-type
stochastic process consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.
Clearly a person’s income is generally not continuously traded in any market in
any meaningful sense, let alone an efficient one conforming to Merton’s requirements.
Accordingly, neither of these assumptions can hold in relation to the analysis of borrower
incomes.
Merton describes both of these assumptions as critical, and the detailed mathematical
framework of the Merton Model does indeed depend on them. Nevertheless, we show
below that a meaningful analysis can still be developed from our weakened starting
point.
4 Risk Weights for Serviceability
We can now derive Risk Weights for serviceability, based on the treatment of net income
as a distribution.
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4.1 Key Assumptions
4.1.1 Income Stress
In line with common lender practice, we assume that the initial unstressed assessed
income I0 is related to the initial stressed income IN by some stress factor, f ≤ 1.
IN = fI0 (3)
4.2 Income Distribution
We assume that ‘true’ net income, I, within the Default Horizon, is a normally dis-
tributed quantity around I0, with standard deviation equal to some fixed percentage s
of I0. We represent this as I(p), where p is the probability of the actual income within
the Default Horizon being at least I(p). For example, I(0.5) is I, and I(0.7) is the income
of the 30’th centile borrower.
I(p) = InvN(p, sI0, I0)) (4)
or
p(I) = Norm(I, sI0, I0)) (5)
where
InvN is the inverse normal distribution function with arguments (probabil-
ity, standard deviation, mean) and,
Norm is the cumulative normal distribution function with arguments (value,
standard deviation, mean).
4.2.1 Repayment Obligation
R (the borrower’s actual required repayment) can be subject to change, for example as a
result of interest rate changes. Rather than consider R as a distribution, we will assume
that R = RN , that is, the lender’s repayment stress assumption is reached. This means
that the Risk Weights derived relate to the NSR-related risk under the lender’s stressed
repayment assumptions.
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4.3 Derivation of Risk Weights
Since income is a distribution, our repayment coverage, C, also becomes a distribution.
(Note that NSR does not, as it is defined in terms of the assessed I0 and RN .)
C(p) = I(p)/R (6)
There is a probability, pD, that the ‘true’ income level within the Default Horizon is
such that our specified repayment stress (defining RN ) at that time leaves the borrower
with a repayment coverage of exactly 1. We can consider pD to be a measure of the
NSR-dependent probability of default for that borrower, under that repayment stress.
pD is defined by:
C(pD) = I(pD)/RN ≡ 1 (7)
or
I(pD) = RN = fI0/N (8)
We can then express pD for a given NSR directly as
pD(N) = Norm(fI0/N, sI0, I0) (9)
The Risk Weight for a given NSR can now be expressed as the ratio between the pD
for that NSR and pD for some base NSR. We choose 1.0 as our base NSR:
FN =
pD(N)
pD(N = 1)
(10)
or
FN =
Norm(fI0/N, sI0, I0)
Norm(fI0, sI0, I0)
(11)
Now, the form of the normal distribution function is
Norm(aI0, sI0, I0) = c
∫
aI0
−∞
exp
[
−(I − I0)
2
2(sI0)2
]
dI (12)
where c is a constant.
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Dividing through the exponential by I20 and substituting I
′ = I/I0 gives
Norm(aI0, sI0, I0) = c
∫
a
−∞
exp
[
−(I ′ − 1)2
2s2
]
dI ′ = Norm(a, s, 1) (13)
which shows that equation 11 can be simplified to
FN =
Norm(f/N, s, 1)
Norm(f, s, 1)
(14)
At this point, we have derived an expression for ‘theoretical’ factors5 FN based only
on:
• The income stress factor,f ;
• NSR, N ; and
• The standard deviation of ‘true’ income, expressed as a percentage of the ‘true’
income, s.
In particular, the Risk Weights do not explicitly depend on:
• The borrower rate at the time NSR is calculated;
• The interest rate stress in the NSR calculation;
• The required repayment; or
• The borrower’s reported income6.
4.4 The Meaning of pD
We characterise pD above as “a measure of the NSR-dependent probability of default”.
Does it make sense to then derive pD directly for desired cases, rather than just the
Risk Weights FN? We caution that direct calculations of pD using the Method are not
necessarily meaningful.
Consider more carefully what pD represents. It is a measure of the probability of
default, based solely on NSR and ignoring the values of all other characteristics of the
5We would expect that theoretical factors might be adjusted for various practical reasons in setting
actual factors for a working credit risk model.
6As mentioned above, the Method can be used with income distributions other than the normal
distribution. We note that a formulation of factors independent of these elements may not always be
possible.
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mortgage. Specifically, pD is the same for any two mortgages with the same NSR,
regardless of differences in such fundamental characteristics as loan-to-value ratio, or
borrower credit history. Under the Method we are calculating only the ratios that define
Risk Weights (since the effects of these other characteristics cancel out) and not any
observable probability of default. Note that we are implicitly using the Modularity
Assumption referred to above. Specifically, we have assumed that the Risk Weights for
NSR depend only on NSR and not on any other risk characteristics.
Note that the approach of treating the Risk Weights as the derived quantities of
interest, is fundamentally different from Sy [2], who treated probabilities of default as
the quantities of interest.
4.5 Income Distributions and Other Risk Characteristics
The Method as described here considers serviceability as a discrete risk characteristic,
and income as having a single given distribution.
We observe that many borrower characteristics typically used in mortgage credit
risk models could be treated under our Method as secondary parameters affecting the
income distribution, rather than primary factors directly affecting probability of default.
We suggest that this could result in a more internally coherent credit risk model, while
accepting that the construction of such a model would appear to require the development
of a detailed theory of borrower income behaviour.
Some possible examples are:
• A borrower with history of defaults or bankruptcy might be associated with a
negatively skewed distribution (ie, their income is more likely to fall than rise);
• A self-employed borrower might be associated with a wider distribution than a
full-time borrower (ie, they are more exposed to both upside and downside in
income);
• A young professional borrower might be associated with a positively skewed income
(ie, their income is more likely to rise than fall).
5 Numerical Examples
We now provide some specific numerical examples of NSR Risk Weights.
Our examples are based on an income stress, f , of 90%. Table 1 below shows NSR-
related Risk Weights tabulated by NSR, N and income standard deviation, s, calculated
according to equation 14.
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Table 1: Numerical Examples of Risk Weights
Income SD
NSR 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
0.2 6.30 3.96 3.24 2.90 2.71 2.58 2.49
0.3 6.30 3.96 3.24 2.90 2.71 2.58 2.49
0.4 6.30 3.96 3.24 2.90 2.71 2.58 2.49
0.5 6.30 3.96 3.24 2.90 2.70 2.55 2.44
0.6 6.30 3.96 3.22 2.84 2.58 2.38 2.23
0.7 6.29 3.85 2.99 2.53 2.25 2.05 1.90
0.8 5.64 3.16 2.38 2.01 1.79 1.65 1.55
0.9 3.15 1.98 1.62 1.45 1.35 1.29 1.25
1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.1 0.22 0.45 0.59 0.68 0.74 0.78 0.81
1.2 0.04 0.19 0.34 0.46 0.55 0.61 0.66
1.3 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.55
1.4 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.46
1.5 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.40
1.6 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.34
1.7 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.30
1.8 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.26
1.9 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.23
2.0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.21
We particularly note two features of the numerical examples.
Firstly, the range of Risk Weights is very wide, over orders of magnitude, suggesting
serviceability is a powerful risk determinant.
Secondly, small changes of NSR around 1.0 result in significant changes in risk. For
example, at 30% standard deviation, an increase in NSR from 1.0 to 1.1 reduces the
probability of default by 26%.
Readers may object to the inclusion of NSR less than 1 on the grounds that such loans
would not be made. We have included these firstly for completeness, but also because
different lenders can define NSR with different repayment assumptions and stresses.
Accordingly it is possible for one lender to assign a borrower an NSR less than 1, while
another assigns an NSR of 1, and the borrower has an initial repayment coverage greater
than 1. For example a borrower may be assessed and approved on a greatly reduced
initial honeymoon repayment, while the ‘true’ NSR should more properly be assessed on
reversion to normal repayment terms.
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6 Existing Approaches
Approaches to serviceability are hard to find publicly documented. However, anecdo-
tally lenders tend to approach serviceability on a threshold basis for all borrower types.
That is, a borrower must satisfy some minimum requirement (which may vary between
different types of borrower), but no or limited credit is given for excess income.
This appears at odds with the results in the Method outlined above, and the numer-
ical examples. If serviceability is so important, should lenders have noticed these results
and started using more differentiated risk weights?
We suggest some potential explanations.
6.1 Rising Asset Values
In a benign economic environment (often regarded as ’normal’) where credit is cheaply
available and the value of assets used as security are rising, then much default behaviour
can be ‘masked’ by the successful liquidation of the security, largely eliminating the need
to worry about serviceability beyond minimum threshold requirements. Of course, once
asset prices start falling and credit is rationed, the risk mitigation of overcollaterisation
disappears and serviceability becomes key.
6.2 Threshold Incentives
When a lender imposes a serviceability threshold, this can create an incentive to lend
up to that threshold. In simple terms, lender revenues are maximised by lending to
the threshold, while borrower utility (if thought of as the ability to obtain credit and
purchase assets) is similarly maximised. A simple serviceability threshold discourages
deeper examinations of the risks associated with serviceability, or even the collection
and storage of data.
7 Other Applications
While this paper has focused on analysing serviceability, we suggest that the mathemat-
ical approach described is not necessarily restricted to this risk characteristic. In fact,
the same approach could be applied to any quantity which:
• Is known at the time of application and settlement;
• Subsequently varies unpredictably, but can be meaningfully thought of as following
a distribution;
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• Induces a default once it reaches a certain value; and
• Does not satisfy the critical assumptions of the Merton Model.
An example might be loan-to-value ratio in a limited recourse environment, where
a borrower is incentivised to default once the perceived property value falls below a
threshold percentage of the outstanding debt. While at first sight this might seem to
simply restate Merton’s original proposition in the context of mortgages, it differs in two
respects:
1. The market for residential property does not appear to fulfil the critical assump-
tions of the Merton Model, leading to our different treatment; and
2. The default is not treated as a simple asset insufficiency, but as driven by bor-
rower behavior, potentially leading to quite different numerical assumptions and
outcomes.
8 Regulatory Issues
Of late, regulators are increasingly focused on how to ensure that regulatory capital is
appropriately set ‘through the cycle’. To this end, the Basel III rules include measures
intended to
“dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement;
promote more forward looking provisions;
conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector
that can be used in stress; and
achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector
from periods of excess credit growth” [3, para19]
A key difficulty of implementing such a framework is that, as observed above, rising
asset values and benign economic conditions can mask default behavior, so that historical
data alone is not an appropriate guide to setting capital requirements.
We suggest that introducing a capital allocation or stress based on serviceability, such
as could be based on the Method, would provide a natural counter-cyclical component to
capital requirements. Simply, while rising asset values and benign economic conditions
tend to encourage reductions in capital based on low recent losses, a serviceability weight
to capital would naturally increase as borrower gearing increases regardless of the value
of the asset securing the loan.
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